Showing posts with label business model. Show all posts
Showing posts with label business model. Show all posts

Sunday, May 15, 2011

The Business Model of Intellectual Ventures

Perhaps one of the more controversial participants of CIP Forum 2011 is Intellectual Ventures, founded in 2000 by Nathan Myhrvold and Edward Jung of Microsoft, Peter Detkin of Intel and Grogory Gorder of Perkins Coie. The company has been referred to as a patent troll (see separate post on Non-Practicing Entities) and Nathan Myhrvold as the most feared man in Silicon Valley. The company and its founders claim to invest in “pure invention”.

The firm is the owner of one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing patent portfolios, and they have reportedly raised over $5 billion from companies including Microsoft, Intel, Sony, Nokia, Apple, Google, SAP, Nvidia and eBay plus investment firms. It generates revenues from licensing and technology and rights, and according to Joff Wild of the IAM Magazine, in the spring of 2010, Intellectual Ventures claimed its purchasing activity had sent $315 million to individual inventors and $848 million to small and medium size enterprises “to commercialize their inventions”. According to an article in The New York Times in 2010 the company says it has returned $1 billion to investors and collected more than $1 billion in license fees.

Since 2009 Intellectual Ventures also operates a prototyping and research laboratory where it employs scientists, engineers and patent attorneys, “to work on new inventions to help solve some of the world’s biggest problems”. To do this, the company has hired prominent scientists including Robert Langer of MIT, Leroy Hood of the Institute for Systems Biology, Ed Harlow of Harvard Medical School, Danny Hillis of Applied Minds, and Sir John Pendry of Imperial College. Intellectual Ventures claims the company files about 450 patents a year, in areas from vaccine research to optical computing.

Intellectual Ventures is constantly building its library of inventions and rights, analyzing industry trends and identifying market opportunities for the use of the inventions. Commercialization can be not only through patent licensing but through open source, joint-ventures, venture creation or sale of portfolios.

On December 8, 2010, Intellectual Ventures filed their first lawsuit, accusing Check Point, McAfee, Syamtec, Trend Micro, Elpida, Hynix, Altera, Lattice and Microsemi of patent infringement. The company has also been accused of hiding behind shell companies for earlier lawsuits.

Below is a few videos with Nathan Myhrvold and others at Intellectual Ventures presenting their business model and fascinating inventions from their research laboratory.











Business Models of Non-Practicing Entities

With the upcoming CIP Forum 2011 the focus will once again be on growth from innovation and innovation-based business models.

In the discussion of organizations that provide technology or patent rights to others, Non-Practicing Entities or as some of them are called "Patent trolls" are always debated. My objective with this post is to introduce the concepts and explain the frequently disputed business model.

A few words about patents
A patent is an exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, selling or distributing an invention that is considered new, non-obvious and useful or industrially applicable. A patent does not give the proprietor of the patent the right to use the patented invention, should it fall within the scope of an earlier patent. Patents per se has nothing to do with the business model used by the patent holder or the pricing of products; Skype, Google, and other firms known for providing free services to their users, is still developing and filing patents to claim their rights to inventions, primarily to keep competitors away.

A patent is a limited right (often 20 years from the filing date) that the government offers to inventors in exchange for their agreement to share the details of their invention with the public. The patent system incentivizes organizations to invest in research and development, and to disclose instead of keeping inventions secret in exchange for exclusivity. Being able to keep competitors away for a limited time, gives the inventor the chance to recover their up-front investment in making the invention. For a new pharmaceutical drug this investment can be billions of dollars. In contrast to some granted patents covering software or business methods, the investment can in some cases be close to zero excluding the costs of patent filing. Like any other property right, a patent may be sold, licensed, mortgaged, assigned or transferred, given away or abandoned.

Monetizing innovations
A university researcher or single inventor can chose to start a company to manufacture and sell products based on its research outcome, or chose to use the exclusive right status of a patent to become a licensor. This allows the inventor to accumulate capital from licensing the invention so the inventor's time and energy can be spent on pure innovation, allowing others to concentrate on manufacturability and marketing of downstream products. This can be seen as a straight forward application of Adam Smith's division of labor that having a group of people focus exclusively on inventing new things.

There are numbers of research-based companies that develop new technology or pharmaceutical drugs just to license it to other firms to commercialize. The object for transaction can be just the right to exclude someone, or it can be drawings, data, relating non-patented inventions, knowledge in different forms, knowhow etc.

This ability to assign ownership or rights increases the liquidity of patents as property. Third parties can license or acquire patents and the same rights to prevent others from exploiting the inventions, as if they had originally made the inventions themselves. Small companies or individual inventors that don't have the funds to claim their rights against multinational companies can sell their patents to companies willing to enforce them against infringers.

Licensing of patents is nothing new. In 1894, American Bell Telephone Company's R&D department licensed 73 patents from outside inventors, developing only 12 inventions from its own employees.


Cross-licensing of patent rights
It is common for companies engaged in complex technical fields to enter into license agreements associated with the production of a single product. Scott McGregor, President & CEO of Broadcom, has said that "a cell phone these days can have hundreds of devices that are part of it; each one of those can have hundreds of aspects to it. You could literally have a million or more patents that would apply to a single handset". It is therefore common that even competitors license patents to each other under cross-licensing agreements in order to share the benefits of using each other's patented inventions and reduce the risk of being sued by the other party.

When one company sues another (Nokia vs Apple) the other company often countersues the first one (Apple vs Nokia) and the litigation process often results in that the parties come to an agreement, cross license patents, and pay licensing fees to the company with a stronger case. Counter-assertion is an important stabilizing force in many patent disputes.
Non-Practicing Entities - a question of value proposition
A non-practicing entity (NPE) is a patent owner who does not manufacture or use patented inventions but rather than abandoning the rights to exclude, an NPE seeks to license the rights to others. The value proposition is thus not a product or service, but the rights to an invention with or without supporting knowledge and know-how. A single inventor, a university, a research institute, an SME, a multinational company or an investment fund, can all be non-practicing entities, depending on their choice of business model.

The term patent troll is sometimes used for NPEs that enforce its patents against one or more alleged infringers in an aggressive or opportunistic manner. The general idea of these firms is to develop a large patent portfolio and to license these patents to companies that infringe on them or potentially filing lawsuits against these companies if they refuse to take a license. In some cases the NPE analyze popular products on the market to find remote patents that could be infringed, and approach the patent holder to acquire or get a license to sue.

In some cases these firms have as their business model to purchase patents, often cheaply from technology companies forced by bankruptcy to auction its patents, with the sole purpose to sue and enforce it against companies that manufacture or market products, potentially infringing any of the patents. Some of those accused of being patent trolls argue that they are the modern incarnation of Robin Hood helping smaller companies and inventors against large companies who have stolen their ideas.

Legal extortion or value proposition?
To seek to derive income from the enforcement of patent rights is perfectly legal but it sometimes has troubling implications for the makers and sellers of products and services. As the entity is not selling products or services, almost by definition it does not infringe on the patent rights contained by others, thus they are essentially invulnerable to counter-assertion.
This gives NPEs a position to negotiate licensing fees that could be argued to be out of alignment with their contribution to the alleged infringer's product or service. As a result, a patent held by an NPE is often considered more threatening to industry participants than the same patent held by a competitor. As a result of that, there are operating companies that sell their patents to NPEs to assert the patents without the operating company being involved.

The more dubious NPEs can see even a weak patent as a lottery ticket hoping the alleged infringer chose to pay up without completing a lawsuit. If the defendant chooses to litigate then both sides must absorb heavy litigation costs no matter who wins. As even a successful litigant must pay the costs of defending its case, and that the cost can run into the millions, operating companies may chose to pay up even though they probably would win if they take the case all the way through trial, to avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty. This is something that the more dubious NPEs take into consideration when they approach operating companies.

Revenue model of Non-Practicing Entities
NPEs generate revenues through licensing agreements or damages awarded by a court. Licensing agreements can include up-front license fees, milestone payments contingent upon achieving certain goals, and royalty revenue from the commercialization of the licensed technology. Damages are awarded on the basis of how much value the defendant is obtaining as a result of its infringing activity.

Activities performed by Non-Practicing Entities
All NPEs have to manage their patent portfolios, and identifying existing or potential application areas. Independent of being a single inventor, a university or a patent holding company, activities also involve finding potential licensees, negotiating terms and conditions and collecting license fees. Most NPEs also have internal research and development and patent filing and maintenance activities. There is a continuum from organizations that are doing substantial investments in R&D to generate inventions and patents, and organizations focusing on acquiring and aggregating others' patents.

The good guys and the bad guys
The business model of Non-Practicing Entities is widely debated and there are firms with dubious motifs. Companies that do not manufacture or intend to manufacture anything are often seen as profiting from others in a negative way (at least in the media). At the same time companies outsource or move production to low cost countries, leaving the western world to be “the innovators” where the output is innovation and intellectual property.

Good guys can be found in both ends of the scale, providing valuable inventions, knowledge, data, instructions or knowhow to manufacturing companies, or just aggregating and providing the rights reducing the time and cost for manufacturing companies to find all relevant patents covering a technology area. Without the existence of entities willing to buy patents as a last resort there’s no credible threat a single inventor can make towards a large company. A rational defendant will simply carry on knowing the patent can’t be successfully enforced, and inventors at the margins may not undertake their research in the first place.

Related posts:
The Business Model of Intellectual Ventures

Sunday, December 12, 2010

List of Key Terms

The term ‘business model’ has historically been defined differently by different academics and consultants, with no common consensus being established. It is not until the last few years that a common definition of what a ‘business model’ is has started to emerge, with an increasing number of authors emphasizing the concepts of value creation and value capture as central to the definition.

One challenge is that frameworks developed from the perspective of enabling business model innovation, are often equated with a definition of the concept of the business model itself. This creates considerable confusion in terms of the differences between the business model of a company, the business model concept as such, and ways of describing business models by adopting different perspectives and frameworks.

In order to provide posts that are easy to follow and to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and confusion, I use the definitions below:
  • Business model – the way an organization creates and captures value
  • Business model concept – the general idea of illustrating how value is created and captured
  • Business model element – a component of how value is created and captured by an organization
  • Business model framework – an abstraction to describe and represent different business models
  • Business model framework element (or framework element) – a component of a business model framework
  • Business model innovation – an innovative business model or the process of innovating a business model
  • Business modeling – the process of testing and simulating different business models
Please consult the list above when confused about my use of any of the terms.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Evan Williams on the Business Model of Twitter

A very interesting conversation with Evan Williams, co-founder Twitter, on how they are trying different revenue models. “There’s a million ways to make money with Twitter... We’ll probably try a few more... We're surprised it's doing better than expected.”

Thoughts on New Business Models for News

Some interesting thoughts on the future of news at the ReThink News summit held in Newport, Rhode Island, a summit sponsored by The School of Journalism at Michigan State University.

TED founder Richard Saul Wurman


Jim Kennedy, director of strategic planning for the Associated Press


Visual communicator David Gray, founder of Xplane


New York Times Multimedia Editor Andrew Devigal


Chris Finlay of the Business Innovation Factory


Media entrepreneur Brooks Bell


Visual communicator and designer Nigel Holmes



Related videos:

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Tom Hulme on How to Visualize your Business Model

Tom is a Design Director at IDEO in London, where he uses the innovation and design process to develop new business opportunities. In these videos he presents a way, very similar to The Business Model Canvas, on how to visualize a business model including the elements of growth- and competitive strategy.





Related posts:
Alexander Osterwalders on the Business Model Canvas
The Evolution of the Business Model Concept

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

Charles Baden-Fuller on why business models are so important for business success

Professor Charles Baden-Fuller talks about the difference between value creation and value capture, robustness, sustainable competitive advantage today and tomorrow, and scalability.

In his recent article in Long Range Planning, Business Models as Models, Charles explores the question "Are Business Models useful?" where he points out that they act as various forms of model: "to provide means to describe and classify businesses; to operate as sites for scientific investigation; and to act as recipes for creative managers".

Sunday, September 5, 2010

The Evolution of the Business Model Concept

Below is a second iteration representing the evolution of the business model concept, including graphical representations, significant publications and books on the subject. Thank you everyone for your input, comments and emails with additional models and publications.

Which business model concepts are you still missing? Which significant publications? Comment below or send feedback to anders@tbmdb.com

Thanks,
Anders

Version 2:

Monday, August 23, 2010

The Evolution of the Business Model Concept (version 1)

Thank you for the input to Version 1 of The Evolution of the Business Model Concept. An updated and extended version of can be found here.

Monday, June 14, 2010

Sunday, June 13, 2010

ngMoco, Guitar Hero and EA Sports in panel discussion on the monetization of games

A nice panel discussion at the Play Conference about the monetization of games moderated by Douglass Perry, covering topics such as Old versus new distribution models, Usage at the center of the business model, Monetizing usage vs downloads, User experience based on platform, Competing with other forms of entertainment, Selling where the customer is and Dynamically and remotely optimization of games and business models. Also interesting to hear how accessories and physical products are affecting business models of software companies that are used to not having any inventory.

Participants:
Neil Young, CEO ngMoco
Kai Huang, Founder Guitar Hero
Peter Moore, President EA Sports



Related videos:

Friday, April 23, 2010

Is Android Evil?

This is a guest post by Andreas Constantinou, an expert in the ecosystems of network operators, handset manufacturers and mobile service providers, research director at VisionMobile and a frequent speaker on the topic of mobile open source.


You thought Android was open? The Android governance model consists of an elaborate set of control points that allows Google to bundle its own services and control the exact software and hardware make-up on every handset. All this while touting the openness rhetoric that is founded on the Apache permissive license used in the Android SDK.

Whereas Android is completely open for the software developer ecosystem, it’s completely closed for the handset OEM (pre-load) ecosystem. There is no other platform which is so asymmetrical in terms of its governance structures.

Indeed, Google’s mobile platform is the smartest implementation of open source designed for driving commercial agendas. But before we dig into why, it’s worth discussing why Android’s success has very little to do with open source.

What makes Android tick
Despite early skepticism, Google’s Android operating system has been unequivocally supported by the mobile industry, including more network operators and handset manufacturers than one can count – with the stubborn exception of Nokia. Android managed to ramp from 1 handset model in 2008 to 50+ models announced for 2010 launch, leaving most industry observers in awe.

The Android success has nothing to do with open source; it’s owed to three key factors:

- Apple. As strange as it might seem, Android owes much of its success to one of its arch-rivals. Let me explain. With the unprecedented success of the iPhone and the take-it-or-leave-it terms dictated by Apple to network operators, the carriers have been eagerly looking for cheaper alternatives; as such the tier-1 operators have been embarking on Android projects to produce iPhones for people who can’t afford the iPhone and more importantly, without forking out the 300EUR+ subsidy needed to remain competitive in an iPhone market.

- Network operators/carriers around the world are eager to differentiate. Android provides the allure of a unified software platform supporting operator differentiation at a low cost (3 months instead of 12+ months offered by SavaJe, which was also aimed at the MNO customisation market). For larger operators with a software strategy, Android also presents a safe investment, as the mainstream option for bringing down the cost of smartphones. That’s why most Android handset projects are backed by a commercial bipoles of operator + OEM deals, with purchase commitments and NRE fees coming from the operator.

- Qualcomm. The $10B chipset vendor has been paramount to Android’s ramp up; manufacturers can take Qualcomm’s hardware reference design which is pre-integrated with Android and can go to market within an estimated 9-12 months (down from 16 months for the Motorola Cliq handset and 24+ months for the HTC G1). Besides Qualcomm we should also mention TI’s OMAP3 platform (on which Moto Droid is based) and ST Ericsson and Broadcom who are ramping up to offer chipsets with out-of-the-box support for Android.

In other words, in an Android handset, most of the OEM budget goes into differentiation; compare that to Symbian where most of the OEM budget goes into baseporting (radio and functional integration of hardware) due to historical choices made by Symbian in 2001. All-in-all, Android allows OEMs to reduce their R&D budgets and invest in differentiation, which is mana from heaven to manufacturers.

We should also not forget the ‘free factor’ (technically zero per-unit royalties for the public SDK) which stirred the emotional hype around Android handsets.

All in all, the ‘open source’ marketing moniker has been very successful at triggering major industry disruption – incl. Nokia ’s acquisition of Symbian and the derailment of Windows Mobile. Perhaps more importantly, the openness rhetoric and the Google aura has attracted thousands of developers on the platform, at a time when the money equation is sub-par; consider that – compared to the Apple devices – Android handsets are around 9x less in volume and paid-for apps are available in 6x fewer countries.

Behind the Open Source facade
What’s even more fascinating is how closed Android is, despite Google’s old don’t be evil mantra and the permissive Apache 2 license which Android source code is under. Paraphrasing a famous line from Henry Ford’s book on the Model-T, anyone can have Android in their own colour as long as it’s black. Android is the best example of how a company can use open source to build up interest and community participation, while running a very tight commercial model.

How does Google control what services, software and hardware ships in Android handsets? The search giant has built an elaborate system of control points around Android handsets.

To dig deeper we spent two months talking to industry sources close to Android commercials – and the reality has been startling. From a high level, Google uses 8 control points to manage the make-up of Android handsets:

1. Private branches. There are multiple, private codelines available to selected partners (typically the OEM working on an Android project) on a need-to-know basis only. The private codelines are an estimated 6+ months ahead of the public SDK and therefore essential for an OEM to stay competitive. The main motivation for the public SDK and source code is to introduce the latest features (those stemming from private branches) into third party apps.

2. Closed review process. All code reviewers work for Google, meaning that Google is the only authority that can accept or reject a code submission from the community. There is also a rampant NIH (not invented here) culture inside Google that assumes code written by Googlers is second to none. Ask anyone who’s tried to contribute a patch to Android and you hear the same story: very few contributions get in and often no reason is offered on rejection.

3. Speed of evolution. Google innovates the Android platform at a speed that’s unprecedented for the mobile industry, releasing 4 major updates (1.6 to 2.1) in 18 months. OEMs wanting to build on Android have no choice but to stay close to Google so as not to lose on new features/bug fixes released. The Nexus One, Motorola Droid, HTC G1 and other Experience handsets serve the purpose of innovation testbeds for Google.

4. Incomplete software. The public source code is by no means sufficient to build a handset. Key building blocks missing are radio integration, international language packs, operator packs – and of course Google’s closed source apps like Market, Gmail and GTalk. There are a few custom ROM builders with a full Android stack like the Cyanogen distribution, but these use binaries that are not licensed for distribution in commercial handsets.

5. Gated developer community. Android Market is the exclusive distribution and discovery channel for the 40,000+ apps created by developers; and is available to phone manufacturers on separate agreement. This is one of the strongest control points as no OEM would dare produce a handset that doesn’t tap into the Android Market (perhaps with the exception of DECT phones, picture frames, in-car terminals or other exotic uses of Android). However, one should acknowledge that Android’s acceptance process for Market apps is liberal as it gets – and the complete antithesis of the Apple vetting process for apps.

6. Anti-fragmentation agreement. Little is known about the anti-fragmentation agreement signed by OHA members but we understand it’s a commitment to not release handsets which are not CTS compliant (more on CTS later).

7. Private roadmap. The visibility offered into Android’s roadmap is pathetic. At the time of writing, the roadmap published publicly is a year out of date (Q1 2009). To get a sneak peak into the private roadmap you need Google’s blessing.

8. Android trademark. Google holds the trademark to the Android name; as a manufacturer you can only leverage on the Android branding with approval from Google, much like how you need Sun’s approval to claim your handset is Java-powered.

In short, it’s either the Google way or the highway. If you want to branch off Android you ‘re completely on your own and you need resources of the size of China Mobile (see their OMS effort) to make it viable (hint: China Mobile is the biggest network operator bar none).

The Open Handset Alliance is another myth; since Google managed to attract sufficient industry interest in 2008, the OHA is simply a set of signatures with membership serving only as a VIP Club badge.

Another big chapter in the Android saga is the CTS (compatibility test suite) which is the formal testing process by which a handset passes Google requirements. According to our sources, CTS extends significantly beyond API compliance, and into performance testing, hardware features, device design, UI specs and bundled services. CTS is based on the principle of ensuring baseline compliance, so it’s ok to add features, but it’s not ok to detract; compare this with Apple’s no-Flash policy. Note that beyond CTS compliance, there are additional commercial licensing agreements that OEMs have to sign for Google services and private line access.

CTS hampers Android’s progress as well, as it precludes OEMs from creating stripped-down versions of Android that would fit on mass-market phones – those shipping in the 10s of millions. CTS – and forward compatibility to the pool of 40,000+ apps – is Google’s main challenge for hitting a 2-digit market share in the smartphone market. These restrictions – and frienemy relationship between Google and its OEM partners – have stirred up discussions of an ‘Android foundation‘ within OEM circles

The Google Endgame
With Android, Google aims to deliver a consistent platform to its own revenue-generating services. For now, this is the ad business. But in the future, Google is aiming at voice (reaching the billions who don’t have a data connection) and Checkout (i.e. becoming the Visa of mobile).

Yet whatever the endgame, it’s worth realising that [from the manufacturer perspective] Android is no more open – and no less closed – than [licensable operating systems like] Windows Mobile, Symbian and BREW; it’s the smartest implementation of open source aimed at driving commercial agendas. Android is much less about the do-no-evil rhetoric that the PR spinners in Mountain View would like us to think.

So, is Android evil? No, it isn’t. It has done no harm – quite the contrary, Android has boosted the level of innovation on mobile software. The point of the article is not to vilify Google or concoct visions of Darth Vader; but to balance the level of openness hysteria with a reality check on the commercial dynamics of mobile open source.